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I.

INTRODUCTION

As Americans witnessed Lech Walesa's rise to power in Poland in
the 1980's, many were exposed to solidarity for the first time. l The
Polish Solidarity Movement, a political juggernaut built on labor
unity, 2 was the embodiment of solidarity, a principle of focused
cooperation among actors to achieve an outcome that benefits all. 3
Solidarity has evolved considerably since the heady days of Walesa.
Today, solidarity is the foundation of numerous responses to
international challenges, many of which deal with environmental
issues. These responses require states to cooperate to protect
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1. G. Nelson Smith III, The Real Challenge to the Polish Revolution: Cleaning
the Polish Environment Through Privitization and Preventative Market-Based
Incentives, 19 PEPP. L. REv. 553 (1992); see generally BBC News Europe, Poland
31,
2005,
Birth,
NEWS.BBC.CO.uK,
Aug.
Marks
Solidarity's
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/4199322.stm (noting the meteoric rise of
Poland's Solidarity movement in 1980); BBC News Europe, Walesa Threatens to
Mar.
30,
2009,
Leave
Poland,
NEWS.BBC.CO.UK,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/7972907.stm (describing Lech Walesa as the
leader of the Polish trade union, Solidarity, that ultimately overthrew Poland's
communist government).
2. Smith, supra note 1, at 564-65 (concluding that Polish environmentalists
were at odds with solidarity, because labor interests feared environmental
initiatives would result in job losses and an economic downturn).
3. See R. St. J. Macdonald, Solidarity in the Practiceand Discourse of Public
InternationalLaw, 8 PACE INT'L L. REv. 259,259-60 (1996).
*
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common environmental interests in various ways. 4 This type of
solidarity, which will be referred to here as environmental solidarity,
results in the creation of agreements that impose legal duties or that
alternatively generate soft law, which creates a pull of legitimacy
without imposing binding obligations. 5 In either case, solidarity
undeniably carries a force that impacts legal regimes.
Environmental solidarity is at work in the United States. It can be
found in regional, multi-state, and even in neighborhood ventures. A
prominent example is the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
(RGGI), a collaborative, multi-state arrangement that strives to
decrease carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector in the
Northeast. 6 Although sub-national efforts like RGGI have garnered a
good deal of attention, they generally are not thought about in terms
of solidarity. Instead, their cooperative nature, to the extent it is
considered at all, is typically viewed as just that: cooperation.7
Recasting these initiatives as examples of environmental solidarity is
more than a descriptive novelty, because the solidarity label opens up
other inquiries. For example, is there something about solidarity that
changes the way one perceives these efforts from a legal standpoint?
More specifically, does this epistemic exercise suggest a new way of
thinking about the legal force these efforts wield? This article
suggests that analyzing sub-national arrangements as examples of
environmental solidarity presents an opportunity to consider in a
special way their power as instruments of legal change.8
An examination of sub-national environmental arrangements as
iterations of solidarity suggests that they are far more than isolated
instances of cooperation with self-contained advantages. Rather, they
are potent precursors of legal reform. Their impact can be as modest
as informing national environmental regulation or as substantial as
transforming the aesthetics of environmental law. As discussed here,
4. Id. at 262-63.
5. Id.
About
Greenhouse
Gas
Initiative,
6. Regional
http://www.rggi.org/about (last visited June 16, 2009).
7. See, e.g., id. (describing RGGI as a "cooperative effort").

RGGI,

8. This article intentionally avoids the literature that questions the
constitutionality of these agreements. See, e.g., Katie Maxwell, Multi-State
Environmental Agreements: Constitutional Violations or Legitimate State
Coordination?, 15 PENN. ST. ENVTL. L. REv. 355 (2007) (presenting arguments

based on the Compact and Commerce Clauses).
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aesthetics refers to more than the "metaphysics of beauty," or the
creation and response to beautiful things. 9 It is more generally "a
10
way of knowing" that engages the senses rather than logic.
Understood in this way, aesthetics exist "in a legal text no less than in
a play by Shakespeare .... ."I The latter part of this article will
suggest that the collective impact of new and existing sub-national
solidarity ventures is changing the aesthetic inputs and outputs of
environmental law.
Part I of this article explores the concept of solidarity, detailing its
foundations in international law and Catholic Social Thought, and its
appearance in critical legal studies, environmental rights, and
environmental justice literature. Part II presents a number of
collaborative environmental undertakings in the United States and
offers them as examples of sub-national environmental solidarity.
Finally, Part III analyzes the range of legal implications these efforts
carry, including broader implications that suggest that these programs
are collectively contributing to a new aesthetic in environmental law
in the United States.
II. THE FOUNDATIONS OF SOLIDARITY

Solidarity has long been associated with labor movements, but it is
solidarity's place in legal discourse that is of concern here. What
follows is an overview of solidarity principles as they have been
analyzed in selected disciplines. International law is a strong source
in this regard; solidarity is a firmly-established guiding principle that
influences various areas of multi-national regulation. In addition,
solidarity and its companion principle, subsidiarity, also enjoy a rich
tradition in Catholic Social Thought (CST), where they are expressly
applied to social and environmental challenges. CST's understanding
of solidarity and subsidiarity is not purely extra-legal, as shown by
the commentary of a number of writers who have been drawn to the
intersection of CST and the law. Other theoretical and outwardly
legal references to solidarity can be found in works that address

9. See KATHERINE EVERETT GILBERT & HELMUT KUHN, A HISTORY OF
ESTHETICS 3 (1972) (describing the Greek origins of aesthetics).
10. DESMOND MANDERSON, SONGS WITHOUT MUSIC: AESTHETIC DIMENSIONS
OF LAW AND JUSTICE 10-11 (2000).
11. Id. at 11-12.

472

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA WREVIEW

[VOL. XX

critical legal studies and environmental justice. These seemingly
diverse shadings of solidarity create a palette that reveals the social
and economic influence of solidarity as well as its legal force.
A. InternationalLaw

As a well-established principle of international law,12 solidarity is
understood "first and foremost [as] a principle of cooperation which
identifies as the goal of joint and separate state action an outcome
that benefits all states or at least does not gravely interfere with the
interests of other states."' 13 The teleological thrust of solidarity - the
common good - is what spurs action to improve the condition of all
parties. 14 Originally understood as a principle of natural law in the
mid-1700's, solidarity was used to justify colonial domination in the
nineteenth century. By the twentieth century, however, it had become
a legal basis for cooperation and mutual responsibility among
nations. 15 Today, the principle of solidarity permeates international
law, but its role and reach are unfixed. To some, solidarity imposes
no extra-legal obligations; to others, it primarily obligates wealthy
states to assist poorer ones; and still others claim it is merely a
' 6
general principle that is "beginning to inform the entire system."'
Regardless of which school of thought one accepts, it is clear that
17
solidarity's reciprocal commitments have legal implications.
Solidarity and cooperation often combine to motivate nations to
work together to reach a common goal. 18 Not only do such
arrangements create "a sense of commonality" among the actors, but
12. The status of solidarity as a principle of international law is due to the fact
that it "has existed within the discourse for a significant period; that it can be found
in the work of qualified publicists; that it is evidenced in multilateral and bilateral
treaties; and that it is a principle gaining both recognition and importance in the
structure of the contemporary international legal order." Macdonald, supra note 3,
at 259; Mark A. Drumbl, Poverty, Wealth, and Obligation in International
EnvironmentalLaw, 76 TUL. L. REv. 843, 923 (2002).
13. Macdonald, supra note 3, at 259-60.
14. Id. at 260.
15. Id. at 260-62.
16. Id. at 262.
17. Id. at 265 (observing, "By definition, solidarity cannot impose a one sided
obligation .. ."). While some international agreements suggest that solidarity may
be one-sided, more recent pronouncements impose uniform obligations. Id. at 26667.
18. Drumbl, supra note 12, at 855.
.
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they impose joint commitments and, at times, continuing obligations
to one another. 19 Solidarity and cooperation may also create
precedent for specific prescriptive practices that may be applied in
the future.20 While these arrangements undoubtedly serve the
individual interests of the participating parties, it2 1is solidarity aimed
at a common objective that makes them possible.
The norms and values that drive solidarity and cooperation are
distinct. Solidarity "identifies as the goal of joint and separate state
action an outcome that benefits all states" while cooperation is more
focused on human welfare, as opposed to the mutual benefit of the
parties. 22 Thus, solidarity triggers joint action directed at a common
good that is narrowly defined by the interests of group members,
while cooperation aims at the greater common good of all. Although
this distinction exists, international agreements that impose
procedural obligations that require states to work together, and
substantive obligations that are directed at the achievement of
common goals, frequently serve both narrow and larger interests.23
In its broadest sense, solidarity is "the basic condition for the
existence of a community of states." 24 It is a principle that, in recent
25
practice, has led to resource transfers from wealthy to poor nations.
These arrangements are more than unilateral acts of charity, as they
create solidarity-driven rights that impose reciprocal duties. In the
environmental arena, these arrangements often involve the transfer of
technology in exchange for natural resource protection. 26 The
obligations created by these agreements may not be equal, but
solidarity nevertheless requires that all states accept that each has
19. Id. (describing such arrangements as "shared compacts").
20. Id. at 860. As an example, Professor Drumbl points to the increasingly
common agreements in international law that obligate developed nations to provide
financial and technological resources to poor nations in exchange for commitments
on the part of poor nations to abide by environmental obligations. Id. at 843
(mentioning the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer as
one example of such a finance/technology swap).
21. See id. at 859.
22. Id. at 923-24 (noting that the mitigation of environmental threats may be the
focus of cooperation). But see infra text accompanying notes 97-98.
23. Drumbl, supra note 12, at 923 (mentioning obligations to transfer funds and
technology as an example of a substantive obligation grounded in solidarity).
24. Macdonald, supra note 3, at 260 (noting the work of Emer de Vattel).
25. Id. at 280.
26. Id.

474

FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LA WREVIEW

[VOL. XX

"obligations of the peace, prosperity, 27and cultural and environmental
health of the global community .... ,"
In many instances, solidarity grounds agreements that
simultaneously serve economic and environmental policies. Typical
agreements require states to cooperate to achieve general objectives
and to protect the more specific economic and environmental
interests of the parties. 28 An example is Article 3 of the Charter of
Economic Rights and Duties of States, which obligates states to
cooperate through consultation and information sharing in order to
optimize the use of shared natural resources. 29 Similarly, the
Declaration of International Economic Cooperation addresses the
global threat of environmental degradation by requiring all countries
to take steps to address environmental harms based on their financial
ability. 3
The increasing number of international agreements that embody
solidarity reflects a shift in international law from a legal order that
fosters co-existence to one that both values and requires
cooperation. 3 1 Perhaps nowhere is this transition more obvious than
in agreements that address global environmental challenges. For
example, the Stockholm Declaration on the Human Environment
prohibits states from undertaking activities within their borders that
cause environmental harm to other states, and further requires states
to develop liability regimes to address such problems.
A more
pointed example of the emergence of solidarity in international
agreements is the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and
Development (OECD) Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution.
This multilateral treaty explicitly references solidarity in its
27. Id. at 281. Macdonald succinctly states that solidarity "changes the rules
from the zero-sum game - 'In order to win, someone else must lose' - to 'No one
wins unless everyone wins."' Id.
28. Id. at 262-63.
29. G.A. Res. 3281 (XXIX), art. III, U.N. Doc. A/3281 (Dec. 12, 1974),
available
at
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NRO/738/83/IMG/NR073883.pdfOpenEleme
nt.
30. Declaration of International Economic Cooperation, G.A. Res. S-18/3, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/S-18/3 (May 1, 1990).
31. See Macdonald, supra note 3, at 283.
32. Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
UN
Doc.
A/Conf.
48/14
(June
16,
1972),
available
at
http://wwwl .umn.edu/humanrts/instree/humanenvironment.html.
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preamble, which provides that countries should cooperate "in a spirit
of international
solidarity" to prevent and control transfrontier
33
pollution.
The common good that underlies both the Stockholm Declaration
and the OECD Principles is freedom from harmful environmental
externalities caused by one's neighbors, a goal that is more singly
environmental than the dually-focused objectives of the Charter of
The considerable number of international
Economic Rights.
agreements that are focused on achieving a common good tied
predominantly to the environment reflects the emergence of what this
article terms environmental solidarity. Examples of these agreements
are plentiful, but two prominent examples are the Montreal and
Kyoto Protocols, agreements that address ozone depletion and
climate change. 34
These Protocols, like other environmental
agreements, were not formed, and are not being implemented in an
economic vacuum. Certainly, economic concerns play a major role
in defining the obligations of parties to international treaties;
that are primarily directed at
however, there a numerous agreements
35
environmental improvement.
A common provision in the numerous treaties that embody
environmental solidarity is one that obligates developed nations to
provide financial assistance or technology transfers to developing
nations to further environmental goals. 36 Once hesitant to accede to
bilateral environmental agreements due to concerns about onerous
resource-draining obligations, developing nations have become more
willing to cooperate in exchange for financial and technological
33. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD] Doc. C
(74)224, 14 I.L.M. 242 (Nov. 21, 1974), reprinted in PHILLIPE J. SANDS,
CHERNOBYL: LAW AND COMMUNICATION: TRANSBOUNDARY
POLLUTION 150 (1988); Macdonald, supra note 3, at 283.

NUCLEAR

AIR

34. See generally Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone
Layer, Sept. 16, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1987); Kyoto
Protocol of the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 11, 1997, 37
I.L.M. 32 (entered into force Feb. 15, 2005).
35. For example, throughout the negotiations surrounding the U.N. Framework
Convention on Climate Change, developing nations argued that any obligations
imposed on them had to be accompanied by financial assistance from developed
nations. See Harro van Asselt & Joyeeta Gupta, Stretching Too Far:Developing
Countries and the Role of Flexibility Mechanisms beyond Kyoto, 28 STAN. ENVTL.
L.J. 311, 318 (2009).
36. Drumbl, supra note 12, at 851, 853.
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assistance.37 Mark Drumbl refers to these agreements as "shared
compacts," which he defines as arrangements "to come together
strategically to attain a particular goal ...[that] communicates a
sense of commonality with others, responsibility, commitment,
38
entitlement, and perhaps even an ongoing moral obligation."
Understood in this manner, shared compacts have all the markings of
a solidarity rights regime, imposing mutual, but differing obligations
on the parties directed at an environmentally-focused common good.
These compacts appear in environmental agreements that39address
ozone depletion, climate change, and biodiversity protection.
There is speculation that developed nations enter into these costly
compacts in order to resolve environmental problems that threaten
them directly, and that any global benefit created by these agreements
is merely consequential. 40 Thus, while general solidarity-based
obligations are undoubtedly at work in the shared compact scenario,
more direct and individualized environmental concerns cannot be
ignored as motivating factors. 41 The possibility that environmental or
economic self-interest plays a role in these agreements does nothing
to disturb their solidarity underpinnings. The common good remains
environmental well-being. Further, the likelihood that commitments
contained in these compacts will yield positive spill-over effects
often guarantees that benefits will be enjoyed beyond any one party's
borders.
The environmental solidarity at work in international agreements
typically unites nation-states to address current environmental
challenges. A more subtle element of environmental solidarity is
37. Id. at 848-49, 851.
38. Id. at 855.
39. Id. at 862-94 (citing U.N. Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992,
1760 U.N.T.S. 79; 31 I.L.M. 818; U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 108; 31 I.L.M. 849; Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, supra note 34). Solidarity and
cooperation alone cannot be credited for all of these arrangements; indeed,
domestic economic advantage is often a motivating factor. See supra text
accompanying note 35.
40. Drumbl, supra note 12, at 931.
41. Id. Drumbl makes this point in part to explain why shared compacts have
addressed only a handful of possible problems. Id. He suggests that, where the
environmental threat to developed nations is less, shared compact language is more
"tepid" or even nonexistent. Id. at 933-94 (citing the international response to
desertification and the regulation of the oceans).
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found in the pronouncements of intergenerational equity that appear
in many agreements. At the 1992 Rio Earth Summit, nations agreed
to incorporate a commitment to future generations into the global
pursuit of sustainability. 42 The concern for future generations adds a
moral component to the common good by forcing present actors to
consider the earth's future inhabitants when making present day
decisions about environmental policies. Intergenerational equity
provisions can alternatively be understood to enlarge the field of
parties who act in solidarity to include the voiceless, faceless
members of future generations. Viewed in this manner, parties to
treaties that include intergenerational equity language in effect agree
to act in solidarity with one another as well as with future
generations.
Regardless of whether intergenerational equity
commitments are read substantively, as a component of the common
good, or procedurally, as an expansion of the class of interested
parties who act as one, they reflect the fairness component of
solidarity. 43
The number of international agreements that bring parties together
to address shared environmental challenges is increasing, further
solidifying solidarity's status as a principle of international law.4 4
The environmental common good that underlies these agreements
may be global or localized; those who act in solidarity may be limited
to existing states, or there may be a broader intent to include future
generations. The possibilities are as diverse as the environmental
challenges that threaten the earth.
B. CatholicSocial Thought
The rich tradition of solidarity in international law is matched by
its strong presence in Catholic Social Thought (CST). A historical
review of numerous sources of CST reveals a commitment to
environmental solidarity that rivals that in international law. CST's
commitment, however, is grounded in faith while international law's

42. See John C. Dernbach, Sustainable Development and the United States, in
AGENDA FOR A SUSTAINABLE AMERICA 1, 4 (John C. Dembach ed., 2009).
43. See Macdonald, supra note 3, at 262.

44. Id. at 283-84, 287 (citing the OECD Principles Concerning Transfrontier
Pollution, the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, and
the Mediterranean Action Plan, as examples).
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commitment is grounded in the relations between states.45 Religious
institutions generally do not have a direct impact on environmental
policy, and the Catholic Church is no exception; 46 nevertheless,
authors have noted that CST embraces principles of environmental
ethics that are commonly expressed in U.S. environmental statutes,
and have further suggested that CST's principles may guide actors in
dealing with other environmental problems.47
The Church has not shied away from environmental issues and has,
instead, dealt with them directly in several papal documents and
statements issued by the United States Catholic Conference. 48 Two
of the Church's guiding principles - the belief that humans are at the
center of creation, and respect for private property 49 - seem at odds
These homocentric and
with a liberal environmental ethic.
buffered,
however, by other
consumer-friendly principles are
directives to treat God's creation in a manner that serves the benefit
of all,50 and to take into account the interests of future generations. 5 '
Together, these supplementary principles reveal the Church's
expansive vision of a common good that encompasses a healthy earth
today as well as in the future.
As early as 1965, the Church confronted environmental issues by
explaining that the relationship between humans and nature is
directly linked to mankind's relationship with God.52 This holistic
vision of "faith, human relationships, and the created world" was

45. For a comprehensive and insightful chronological review of the principles
of environmental ethics - including solidarity - in Catholic social teaching, see
Lucia A. Silecchia, Environmental Ethics from the Perspectives of NEPA and
Catholic Social Teaching: Ecological Guidance for the 21st Century, 28 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 659 (2004).

46. Id. at 667.
47. See id. at 798 (citing CST's alignment with provisions of the National
Environmental Policy Act); see Jamison E. Colbum, Solidarity and Subsidiarity in
a Changing Climate: Green Building as Legal and Moral Obligations, 5 U. ST.
THOMAS L.J. 232, 257-61 (2008) (promoting a subsidiarity-based approach to

climate and energy issues).
48. See generally Silecchia, supra note 45, at 680-761.
49. Id. at 680-82.

50. Id. at 682.
51. Id. at 683.
52. Id. (citing Second Vatican Council, Gaudium et Spes (Dec. 7, 1965), in
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT: THE DOCUMENTARY HERITAGE 166 (David J.

O'Brian & Thomas A. Shannon eds., 1992)).
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reinforced in later teachings, which added themes of intergenerational
equity, human preeminence in creation, and obligations to use God's
creation for the common good.53 Convinced that human exploitation
of nature would degrade humankind, the Church announced in 1971
that environmental challenges were not only the concern of all
humans, but must be shared by all. 54 With this pronouncement, the
Church hinted at what would become a global, solidarity-driven
response to environmental destruction.
Pope John Paul II faced the limitations of the earth's natural
resources and the intolerable pollution of God's gift of creation headon. 55 In his 1988 encyclical, In Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (On Social
Concern), he announced three ecological principles that echoed
previous thought and that additionally introduced new perspectives
that moved the Church towards a solidarity-grounded environmental
world view.
First, the Pope expressed the need for human
understanding of "the nature of each being and of its mutual
connection in an ordered system, which is

. .

. the 'cosmos.'

56

With

this statement, the Church acknowledged the ecological principle of
the interconnection of living things for the first time.57 Second,
because natural resources are limited, the Pope declared that steps
must be taken to preserve them for future generations. 58 Finally, the
Pope drew a connection between environmental damage and
development. 9
Specific references to environmental solidarity first appeared in
John Paul II's Peace Statement, delivered on the World Day of Peace
in 1990.60

Decrying the culture of consumerism and its failure to

53. Id. at 688 (citing Pope Paul VI, Octogesima Adveniens (May 14, 1971), in
CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 52, at 265).

54. Silecchia, supra note 45, at 690 (citing Pope Paul VI, supra note 53).
55. Id. at 692-94 (citing Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens (Sept. 14, 1981),
in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra note 52, at 352, and Pope John Paul II,
Sollicitudo Rei Socialis (Dec. 30, 1987), in CATHOLIC SOCIAL THOUGHT, supra
note 52, at 395 [hereinafter Sollicitudo Rei Socialis]).
56. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 55.
57. Silecchia, supra note 45, at 696.
58. Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, supra note 55.
59. Id. The development-environment connection was to become a hallmark of
John Paul II's thought.
60. Pope John Paul II, The Ecological Crisis: A Common Responsibility,
Message for the Celebration of the World Day of Peace (Jan. 1, 1990), available at
http://www.churchdocs.org/papal/jp.ii/ecology.crisis.
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account for its contribution to global environmental degradation, the
61
Pope announced a series of principles of environmental ethics.
Most pertinent to this discussion are two directives, both stemming
from the Pope's call for an international response to address what he
then saw as an ecological crisis. 62 Despite calling upon all countries
to address this ecological crisis, the Pope acknowledged that
developed and developing countries should have differing
obligations: "These differing but complementary responsibilities...
are urged as the basis of a 'new solidarity' between and among
nations whose environmental problems, priorities, and resources are
vastly different., 63 This new solidarity, which encourages a response
of right action by all nations based proportionately on their problems
and resources, has as its foundation the well-settled CST principle of
subsidiarity, which dictates that "social problems should be addressed
at the lowest level possible, but that higher levels of involvement,
including that of the international community, 64
are acceptable if lower
levels are incapable of resolving the problem."
The subsidiarity slant that CST works into its vision of solidarity at
first appears strained. Solidarity's focus on cooperative response
committed to the common good and subsidiarity's emphasis on the
most suitable level of response may both be relevant to
environmental solutions, but they are seemingly distinct ideas. Yet,
as one commentator explains, the Church sees them as "two sides of
the same coin." 65 Solidarity encourages a collective response based
on the substance of the ultimate goal - the common good - while
subsidiarity manages the response by taking into account the needs
and resources of the actors. The concepts in effect work in tandem.
Solidarity is called for when individual, piecemeal action is
ineffectual to achieve the common good and, once solidarity takes

61. See Silecchia, supra note 45, at 698-99.
62. Silecchia, supra note 45, at 701. The need for a global response stemmed
from the Pope's understanding of the transboundary effects of polluting activities.
See Pope John Paul II, supra note 60, 9.
63. Pope John Paul 1I, supra note 60, 110; Silecchia, supra note 45, at 702.
64. Silecchia, supra note 45, at 701.
65. Colburn, supra note 47, at 238 (remarking that, "[s]ubsidiarity demands that
the central state defer to its subordinate ranks of government and civil society
whenever possible just as solidarity demands that no one's needs be ignored").
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shape, subsidiarity searches for the
optimal decision making level
66
capabilities.
level's
each
based on
The Church's pairing of subsidiarity with a broad view of
environmental solidarity has remained constant, making it clear that
Catholicism's concern for the human environment is no less
important than its concern for the natural environment. 67 In fact, at
the 1992 Earth Summit, the Holy See consistently emphasized the
importance of human dignity while simultaneously urging the need
for solidarity between rich and poor nations to address environmental
challenges. 68 Ten years later, Pope John Paul II again espoused the
goals of subsidiarity and solidarity in the Venice Declaration. 69 By
that time, shared-compact agreements involving finance and
technology swaps by wealthy nations in exchange for proenvironment initiatives by poor nations were on the rise. 70 In the
United States, the 1991 Catholic Conference pastoral statement,
Renewing the Earth, reiterated much of Pope John Paul II's teaching
and expanded on it as well,71 underscoring the global understanding

66. Jerome M. Organ, Subsidiarity and Solidarity: Lenses for Assessing the
Appropriate Locus for Environmental Regulation and Enforcement, 5 U. ST.

L.J. 262, 265, 270 (2008) (Dean Organ applies his two-step process to the
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), concluding
that the former is aligned with the solidarity/subsidiarity framework while the latter
is not.).
67. Silecchia, supra note 45, at 706.
68. Id. at 717-19. The Earth Summit, also informally referred to as the Rio
Conference, is formally known as the 1992 U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development. See id. at 712.
69. Common Declaration of Pope John Paul II and the Ecumenical Patriarch
Bartholomew I (June 10, 2002), in MARJORIE KEENAN, FROM STOCKHOLM TO
THOMAS

JOHANNESBURG: AN HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF THE CONCERN OF THE HOLY SEE
FOR THE ENVIRONMENT 1972-2002, 72-77 (2002); see also Silecchia, supra note 45,

at 720.
70. See generally Drumbl, supra note 12; supra text accompanying note 17.
71. See Silecchia, supra note 45, at 724 (referring to Renewing the Earth as a
"landmark" event in CST). The American bishops ventured beyond Rome's
teachings by specifically raising the issue of environmental justice, emphasizing the
disproportionate environmental harms being suffered by the poor. See United States
Catholic Conference, Renewing the Earth: An Invitation to Reflection and Action
on Environment in Light of Catholic Social Teaching (Nov. 14, 1991), in "AND
GOD SAW THAT IT WAS GOOD": CATHOLIC THEOLOGY AND THE ENVIRONMENT

225 (Drew Christiansen & Walter Grazer eds., 1996).
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of the common
good and the need to pursue the "ethics of
72
solidarity.,
One cannot summarize the environmental ethics of CST without
including intergenerational equity, solidarity, and subsidiarity. 73 All
nations are on an equal footing in terms of the moral obligation to
resolve the current environmental crisis, which affects both present
and future generations. The common good that is the object of CST's
solidarity is respect for, and preservation of God's creation, which is
meant to be enjoyed by all. CST builds into its vision of solidarity a
subsidiarity principle that defines each nation's obligation to address
environmental problems based on its unique circumstances. CST's
desire for intergenerational equity is strong, but it cannot be
interpreted to mean that those who act in solidarity to care for the
earth include members of present and future generations. Instead,
improving the environment for future generations is better understood
as a component of the common good.
As in the case of
environmental solidarity in international law, the power of solidarity
as conceived by CST to suggest, if not drive concrete responses to
environmental threats is undeniable. 74
C. SolidarityRights
Solidarity rights are more conceptually tenuous than the principles
of solidarity found in international law and CST. With solidarity
rights, a right's status is bestowed on solidarity; no longer is it
merely a guiding principle. In some international law and in Critical
75
Legal Studies (CLS) circles this elevated legal status exists.
In debating the nature of an international "right to environment,"
some scholars have explored its human-rights foundation and have
72. Silecchia, supra note 45, at 725-26 (quoting United States Catholic
Conference, supra note 71).
73. Professor Silecchia includes intergenerational equity and subsidiarity in her
list of six themes that emerge from CST. Id. at 731-61. Although solidarity is not
specifically included among these themes, it unquestionably underlies the ethic of
subsidiarity, which devolves from the Church's vision of a "new solidarity." See
supra text accompanying notes 61-63.
74. As Professor Jamison Colburn acknowledges, solidarity and subsidiarity are
capable of "guiding action without having to govern it." Colburn, supra note 47, at
256.
75. See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 34-35 (describing the shared
compact as establishing solidarity rights).
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pointed to its grounding in solidarity rights. 76 The right to
environment in this sense protects individuals from environmental
threats, drawing upon the principles that recognize the
77
interconnectedness of all living things and intergenerational equity.
The right is primarily anthropocentric in that it seeks environmental
well-being for human benefit, but it has also been partnered with a
"right of environment," which recognizes the intrinsic value of the
environment in and of itself.78
Solidarity rights are described as "third-generation rights,...
characterized as individual and collective rights or aspirations that
require for their realization the cooperation or solidarity from the
individual, the state, public and private bodies, and the international
community., 79 The solidarity-rights basis of the right to environment
is admittedly controversial,8 0 but it seems particularly well-suited for
environmental problems, which nearly all perspectives believe
demand a collective response. 81 Thus, a solidarity rights approach
configures a right to environment that includes individual protection
from environmental harm and "a collective right obligating the state
problems through international
to resolve environmental
cooperation."' 82 Despite the persuasiveness of this concept and its
recurrence in current literature, 83 solidarity rights have been looked

76. See generally Luis E. Rodriguez-Rivera, Is the Human Right to
Environment Recognized Under InternationalLaw? It Depends on the Source, 12
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 1 (2001).

77. Id. at 9, 14, 16.

78. Id. at 15.
79. Id. at 21. The third-generation concept of solidarity rights first appeared in
the work of Dr. Karel Vasak in 1979, which described human and political rights
and economic and social rights as first and second generation rights, respectively.
See id. at 20-21.
80. Id. at 1.
81. See id. at 21.
82. Id. at 21 (arguing that the Stockholm Declaration and the general growth of
international environmental law support such a right).
83. See, e.g., Mariana T. Acevedo, The Intersection of Human Rights and
Environmental Protection in the European Court of Human Rights, 8 N.Y.U.
ENVTL. L.J. 437, 459 (2000) (promoting a solidarity rights-based right to
environment in international law).
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on with disfavor by traditionalists 84 and have been largely ignored by
85
international courts.
An even more radical conception of solidarity rights appears in
CLS literature.
Flowing from Roberto Unger's vision of
86
"institutional reconstruction" aided by deviationist doctrine,
solidarity rights give legal effect to moral obligations that "arise from
relationships of interdependence that have been only partly
articulated by the will and only obliquely influenced by the state." 87
These rights form part of a larger system of rights that would ideally
inform the realm of communal life, which Unger describes as "those
areas of social existence where people stand in a relationship of
heightened mutual vulnerability and responsibility toward each
' 88
other."

Solidarity rights transform expectations of "mutual reliance and
vulnerability" into legal obligations in a two-part process:
The initial moment of the right is an incomplete definition
that incorporates standards of good-faith[,] loyalty or
responsibility. The second moment is the completing
definition through which the rightholders themselves (or
the judges if the rightholders fail) set in context the
concrete boundaries to the exercise of the right according to
the actual effect that the threatened exercise seems likely to
89
have upon the parties to the relationship.

84. A common criticism of the solidarity rights theory is that it fails to consider
the option of "progressive development of the content of existing rights."
Rodriguez-Rivera, supra note 76, at 22 (citing Philip Alston, A Third Generationof
Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation of International
Human Rights Law?, 29 NETH. INT'L L. REV. 307, 316-17 (1982)).
85. Acevedo, supra note 83, at 438 (promoting a solidarity rights-based right to
environment in international law, but concluding that the European Court of
Human Rights instead derives environmental rights from individual civil and
political rights).
86. ROBERTO MANGABEIRA UNGER, THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT

36,43 (1986).
87. Id. at 37 (stating that the various iterations of "communal experience
need to be thought out in legal categories and protected by legal rights").
88. Id. at 36.
89. Id. at 39-40. As an example, Unger uses fiduciary law, which departs from
general contract doctrine, pursuant to which one contracting party need not take
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The transformation of communal practice and preference into
solidarity rights is not meant to replace entire branches of legal
doctrine. Instead, it serves to expand existing doctrine 90 or explain
incongruous legal exceptions to mainstream principles. 9' In both
cases, solidarity rights acknowledge that the line between law and
community is blurred in ways that the law fails to articulate. 92 Unger
does not anticipate rapid legal change; instead, he envisions a slow
process towards a realization of more precise and explicit legal
systems accompanied by changes in governmental and economic
institutions as well. 9 3 The goal is to construct legal doctrine in a
manner "that can more readily accommodate both a broad range of
different sorts of rights or obligations and a conception of
community, as a zone of heightened mutual vulnerability, that gives a
account of what attracts us to the communal ideal
more satisfactory' 94
place."
in the first
The solidarity rights of Unger's reconstituted legal system seek to
give legal weight to existing communal and moral obligations of
mutual loyalty that have had no voice in the law or that have seeped
into doctrine without adequate substantiation or explication. 95 These
rights provide a means of doing the work of existing law "without the
capricious distinctions and confining premises of established
doctrine." 96 Alternatively, they can articulate a countervision to legal

account of the other party's interests. Id. at 83. In contrast, fiduciaries are legally
obligated to give another's interests "a weight greater than ... his own." Id.
90. Id. at 45-57 (explaining how deviationist doctrine can expand existing equal
protection doctrine).
91. Id. at 83-85 (noting the fiduciary law exception to basic contract law).
92. Id. at 83. Unger admits that the general application of solidarity rights to a
broad legal doctrine such as contract law would pose problems, but he believes that
is no reason to abandon solidarity rights in exceptional circumstances especially
when, in practice, parties act with a sense of responsibility toward one another. Id.
93. Id. at 39, 85.
94. Id. at 86.
95. Id. Unger again points to the fiduciary law exception to contract law's firm
acceptance of "unadulterated self-interest and pure calculation." Id. More
specifically, he argues that mainstream contract doctrine "foster[s] the confusion of
mutual loyalty with acquiescence in a regime of personalistic power while
depriving of appropriate legal help the elements of trust and interdependence in
business life." Id.
96. Id. at 53. Here, Unger critiques existing equal protection jurisprudence and
introduces the benefits of an expanded vision based on destabilization rights:
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principles and their
exceptions that currently can be explained only in
"clashing ways." 97
International law's solidarity rights, which mandate obligations of
cooperation and loyalty among states to address common challenges,
are easily distinguished from the solidarity rights of CLS, which
provide a means of giving legal life to communal obligations in cases
where legal principles are unnecessarily narrow and capricious, or
doctrinally discordant. 98 Despite their differences, both theories
demonstrate the transformative potential of solidarity rights. In
international law and CLS alike, solidarity rights elevate communal
values to normative status such that community members are
expected to act in compliance with widely shared beliefs and
practices. 99
International law, CST, and the theories associated with solidarity
rights provide insight into the doctrinal status of solidarity, but they
fail to furnish a practical explanation of the conditions that ripen to
the point of inciting a unified response.
Under these three
perspectives, the community of nations, moral or religious obligation,
and legal indeterminacy are formative of solidarity in the abstract.
Political, legal, economic, and environmental conditions, on the other
[Equal protection's] safeguard against the discriminatory persecution of
the individual ... would expand into a guarantee against whatever might
threaten his richly defined position of immunity. The correction of
irremediable collective disadvantages through checks upon legislative
classification . . . would undergo two complementary expansions. It

would free itself from its arbitrarily selective focus upon some sorts of
group inferiority . . . to the exclusion of others .. .[and] it would also
seek to break up entire areas of institutional life and social practice that

run contrary to the scheme of the new-modeled constitution.
Id.
97. Id. at 88. The countervision adjusts legal understanding to form a "more
comprehensive legal theory" that may become generally applicable to other areas
of law. Id. at 88-89 (acknowledging that the process will be "destabilizing").
98. Some writers have taken solidarity rights further by, for example, using
them as a vehicle to inject communitarian values into property law. See, e.g.,
Thomas F. McInerney III, Common Ground: Reconciling Rights and Communal
Concerns in Real PropertyLaw, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REv. 831, 847-49 (1998).
99. See id. at 849. McInerney notes that Unger's work, among others, can make

an important contribution to property jurisprudence, as it both incorporates
individual expectations in relation to community and addresses a "need to develop
a political theory supportive of communities." Id. at 854 (also citing the work of
Ronald Dworkin and Eric Freyfogle).
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hand, typically furnish the immediate motivations for specific
solidarity ventures. An examination of examples of solidarity
initiatives in the United States sheds more light on the social,
political, and legal preconditions that may combine to unify actors in
solidarity.
III. SUB-NATIONAL SOLIDARITY IN THE UNITED STATES

The identification of activities in the United States that can
rightfully be characterized as instances of environmental solidarity
requires an understanding that solidarity transcends coordinated
action and mere cooperation. The distinction between cooperative
ventures and solidarity centers on an intensity and focus that give
solidarity the potential to push the legal envelope in various ways.
Cooperation is defined as a "common effort" or an "association of
persons for [a] common benefit," while solidarity refers to "unity (as
of a group or class) that produces or is based on community of
interests, objectives, and standards." 100 These definitions indicate
that cooperation involves coordinated action among people with a
common goal of a general nature10 1 that tolerate self-centered action
by individual actors as long as a common objective is shared.
Solidarity has more focus and vigor, and requires a unity among
actors directed at specific concerns of the community. The complete
unity of solidarity °2 includes cooperation, but it requires
considerably more.
Solidarity's focused energy creates a "collective force" among
03
actors that often generates uniformity and consistency of action.'
This contrasts sharply with collective action undertaken by actors
who may share common interests but who are nevertheless primarily
focused on benefits for themselves.' 0 4 Thus, when searching for
examples of sub-national solidarity, many traditional regional
100. MERRAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 255, 1118 (10th ed. 1993).
101. See supra text accompanying note 19.
102. WEBSTER'S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1355 (1992).
103. See James Ruh], Note, Quicksilver Alchemy: New England's Mercury
Control Programs and the Clean Air Mercury Rule, 32 VT. L. REV. 525, 543
(2008).
104. See John M. Olin, Note, State Collective Action, 119 HARv. L. REV. 1855,
1855-56 (2006) (explaining that such ventures risk creating negative externalities
that may harm the nation as a whole).
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alliances must be rejected. "Regionalism" in this sense is any
cooperative grouping of smaller governmental entities that work
together to address a common problem. 10 5 A primary goal of
regional efforts is to create a total effect that is greater than the sum
of its parts;10 6 however, regional efforts do not reach the level of
solidarity until there is a buy-in by all participants of a common good
tied to community-wide well-being combined with focused action
that demonstrates acceptance of uniform, consistent response. 107
There are numerous environmental initiatives in the United States
that share these characteristics.
A few are described below,
organized by three common goods to which they are directed. Even
this small sampling suffices to demonstrate their variety and hint at
their impact.
A. Air Quality
The regional greenhouse gas initiatives in the United States are
among the strongest examples of environmental solidarity. Two of
these efforts, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) and the
Western Climate Initiative (WCI) have brought states and, in the case
of the WCI, western states and Canadian provinces, together to
reduce greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions. 1 8 Each initiative seeks to
establish a cap-and-trade regime to achieve GHG reductions. RGGI
focuses on reducing carbon dioxide emissions from power plants,
0 9
while WCI is directed more generally at reducing all GHGs.1
These unified coalitions were motivated, in part, by the growing
threat of climate change and the need to plan and work together to

105. James L. Olmsted, The Global Warming Crisis: An Analytical Framework
to RegionalResponses, 23 J. ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 125, 125 (2008).

106. Id.
107. Id. at 138 (suggesting that regional solidarity involves actors working as one
toward the goals of the whole body).
108. See generally Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A. Meyler, Like a Nation

State, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1621, 1636-37 (2008). RGGI involves the united effort of
the northeastern states of Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Rhode Island, and Vermont. See
Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, supra note 6. WCI joins together California,
Arizona, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, British Columbia and
Manitoba. Kysar & Meyler, supra, at 1636.
109. See Kysar & Meyler, supra note 108, at 1636.
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develop programs that would
integrate easily with other GHG
0
emission trading regimes. "1
RGGI and the WCI are more than loose groupings of neighboring
states that have agreed to cooperate to address the problem of global
warming. Although they may aptly be described as ethical, or even
1 they additionally exemplify the unity of action,
competitive efforts, 11
uniformity, and consistency that typify solidarity. All participants in
RGGI have agreed to cap carbon dioxide emissions from power
plants and reduce emissions by ten percent within the next decade. "12
Further, participants have adopted the RGGI Model Rule as a
blueprint for their own implementing regulations. 1 3 Although each
RGGI jurisdiction will eventually have its own regulatory program,
RGGI will ultimately "function
as a single regional compliance
114
emissions."
carbon
for
market
Similarly, the WCI reflects a unified effort to develop a crossjurisdictional strategy to address climate change. 115 Since 2007, the
WCI participants have worked toward developing a regional target to
reduce GHG emissions. They also plan to establish a shared GHG
tracking registry and institute a cap and trade program to achieve
WCI participants have joined in a
GHG reduction goals. 116
commitment to "identify, evaluate, and implement policies to tackle
climate change at the regional level,"' 17 reflecting the unified action
toward a common good that is the hallmark of solidarity.
The solidarity of RGGI and the WCI is to be contrasted with
situations where a handful of states react simultaneously and
similarly to an environmental issue, such as the multi-state response

110. Id. The Bush administration's reluctance to act to reduce domestic GHG
emissions was another motivating factor. See id. at 1622.
111. See Barry G. Rabe, Mikael Romdn & Arthur N. Dobelis, State Competition
as a Source Driving Climate Change Mitigation, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 21
(2005).
112. Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, supra note 6.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Western
Climate
Initiative,
About
the
WCI,
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/about-the-wci (last visited on June 16, 2009).
116. Western
Climate
Initiative,
History,
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/history (last visited on June 16, 2009).
117. Western
Climate
Initiative,
Organization,
http://www.westernclimateinitiative.org/organization (last visited on June 16, 2009).
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in New England to address mercury emissions.' 18 Concerned about
EPA's Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR), which they believed
inadequately regulated mercury emissions from electric utility steam
generating units (EGUs), 119 four New England states chose to
implement more stringent mercury control programs. 120 Each state
imposed its own mandatory reductions in EGU mercury emissions
with a strict compliance date, representing a radical departure from
the cap and trade rule promulgated by the EPA, a rule that was later
invalidated. 12 1 The states' disagreement with the EPA and the
similarity of their mandatory mercury regulations was an aggressive
response, but fell short of what solidarity would entail: a cohesive
approach by the region as a whole.' 22 The lack of unity led Professor
James Ruhl to point out that the New England region may have had
more success in dislodging the EPA from what it believed to be a
weak mercury emission stance if it formed a RGGI-like regional
alliance. 123 In a rare reference to "regional solidarity" in the United
States, Professor Ruhl suggests that the "collective force,"
118. See generally Ruhl, supra note 103.
119. In 2000, the EPA determined it was "necessary and appropriate" to regulate
mercury emissions from electric utility steam generation units (EGUs) pursuant to
section 112 of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412 (2006). Ruhl, supra note 103, at
526-27. Five years later, however, the EPA reversed its decision and removed
EGUs from regulation under section 112 because of what it believed to be a
tenuous relationship between mercury emissions and human health. Id. at 529-30.
Based on this reversal, the EPA promulgated the Clean Air Mercury Rule (CAMR)
pursuant to § 111 of the Act, establishing a cap and trade program to reduce
mercury emissions from EGUs that would be implemented in 2010. Id. at 534, 535.
The rule was widely criticized as too weak when compared to the mandatory
technology that would have been required if mercury was regulated under section
112. Id. at 534.
120. Ruhl, supra note 103, at 541. The states included Connecticut, Maine,
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire. Rhode Island and Vermont were not subject
to the EPA rule. Id. at 542.
121. The states were later vindicated when the CAMR was vacated due to EPA's
failure to adequately explain the delisting of mercury as a hazardous air pollutant.
Id. at 541-42; see New Jersey v. EPA, 517 F.3d 574 (D.C. Cir. 2008), cert denied,
129 S. Ct. 1308 (2009); DAVID WOOLEY & ELIZABETH MORISS, CLEAN AIR ACT
HANDBOOK § 6:32 (2009); Meghan McGuinness & A. Denny Ellerman, The Effects
of Interactions Between Federal and State Climate Policies, 5 & n.14 (Ctr. for
Energy and Envtl. Policy Research, Working Paper No. 0804, 2008), available at
http://tisiphone.mit.edu/RePEc/mee/wpaper/2008-004.pdf.
122. See Ruhl, supra note 103, at 542.
123. Id. at 543-44.
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"uniformity," and "consistency" of initiatives such as RGGI are what
give them force. 124
B. Water Quality
Increasing attention to watershed health in the United States has
given rise to coordinated, collective endeavors to improve the quality
of some of the nation's most compromised water resources. Two
notable examples are the Chesapeake Bay program and the Great
25
Lakes initiative. 1
After several years of regulation under the Clean Water Act,
126
cleaning up the Chesapeake Bay remained an elusive objective.
The inadequacy of the Act's provisions led to the creation of the
Chesapeake Bay program in 1983, which partnered the EPA with
three states and the District of Columbia, all of which work jointly to
improve the quality of one of the east coast's critically important
ecosystems. 127 The program is comprehensive and further devolves
responsibility to "tributary teams" comprised of business and
agriculture interests, scientists, and government agents. 12' Guided by
mutually agreed upon objectives, participants commit to obligations
under the EPA's supervision. 129 The program is not merely an
arrangement for mutual consultation, but rather a legitimate
governance structure that unifies government and non-government
30
actors in a collaborative enterprise focused on a common good. 1
A similar effort has united the United States and Canada in the
Great Lakes initiative, which also arose in the face of inadequate
progress under the command and control provisions of the Clean
Water Act. 131 It, too, involves a nested framework of actors focused
on aquatic ecosystem management, supervised by liaisons from the
124. Id. at 543.
125. See Bradley Karkkainen, Marine Ecosystem Management & A "PostSovereign" Transboundary Governance, 6 SAN DIEGO INT'L L.J. 113, 126-32
(2004) (citing the Chesapeake Bay program and the Great Lakes initiative as
examples).
126. Id. at 126.

127. Id. at 126-27.
128. Id. at 127.
129. Id. at 128.
130. See id. at 124. The Program has served as a model for other threatened
watersheds. Id. at 126.
131. Karkkainen, supra note 125, at 130.
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EPA and Environment Canada.132 As is true of the Chesapeake Bay
program, the Great Lakes effort represents a joint commitment by
state and non-state actors to collaborate across borders to insure the
viability of a major natural resource. 133
The EPA offices that spearhead the Chesapeake Bay and Great
Lakes programs help coordinate policies, but they do not exercise
decision-making powers for either alliance. 134 Further, although
these efforts rely on a mix of regulatory tools, legal instruments, and
voluntary practices that are implemented by actors at all conceivable
levels in a vertical hierarchy,' 35 they are nonetheless singularly
focused on improving the quality of two of the nation's most
important aquatic ecosystems. Each is an example of sub-national
environmental solidarity arising from an alliance
of actors who face
36
degradation.'
ecosystem
transboundary
serious
C. EnvironmentalJustice
In their provocative work detailing the disintegration of social
identity in the environmental justice movement, Mihaela Popescu and
Oscar Gandy address at length the nature of solidarity among
inhabitants of environmental justice communities. 137 They explain:
The significance of the disruptive event and the solidarity
with communities in similar situations are critical elements
in the establishment of a sense of community. Claims of
solidarity and significance represent strategic rhetorical
resources with which communities express their identity.
Therefore, the basis for asserting solidarity and significance

132. Id. The EPA's Great Lakes National Program Office was modeled after the
Chesapeake Bay office. Id.
133. Id. at 133.
134. Id.

135. See id. at 127-128 (noting the devolution of responsibilities from higher
levels of governance to local management efforts).
136. Id. at 124 (describing these initiatives as "dynamic and continuously
evolving polyarchic arrangements" occurring in an era of "post-sovereign
governance")
137. See generally Mihaela Popescu & Oscar H. Gandy, Jr., Whose
Environmental Justice? Social Identity and InstitutionalRationality, 19 J. ENVTL.
L. & LrrIG. 141 (2004).
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in the context of38the environmental justice movement must
be understood. 1
The "disruptive event" for an environmental justice community is
an environmental harm which is thought to affect the community
disproportionately when compared to more affluent white
communities.1 39 The event triggers solidarity among community
members, which is deeply and simultaneously informed by three
factors: the environment, community identity, and rights. 40 The
deteriorating environment unites the community, as does the identity
of the community itself, which is formed by the interaction of a
number of factors that include race, socioeconomic status, culture,
location, and significance.' 4 1 In the environmental justice context,
the rights component of solidarity refers to the legal theory chosen by
plaintiffs to pursue their claims. Often, environmental justice
plaintiffs prefer to pursue sophisticated equal protection claims and
injunctive relief rather than tort-based causes of action that provide
monetary awards. 142 The common good that unifies communities in
these cases is not the prospect of financial compensation for
environmental injury; instead, it is the hope of restoring
neighborhoods to healthy places in which to live and work. 143
The unity of environmental justice communities is a cogent
example of solidarity, but Popescu and Gandy warn that various
practices associated with environmental justice litigation are
increasingly inhibiting communities from relying on the rhetoric of
138. Id. at 156.
139. See id. at 157.
140. Id.

141. Id. Popescu and Gandy argue that "significance" is as important to an
environmental justice community's identity as is solidarity. Id. at 156 (noting that
claims of solidarity and significance represent strategic rhetorical resources with
which communities express their identity).
They explain, "Community
significance is constructed by its internal identification as a symbolic unit, its
dependence or autonomy to a larger unit that contributes to the development of a
symbolic border as a means of external identification, and the emphasis on the
common experience of oppression." Id. at 164.
142. Id. at 157.
143. Id. Compensating communities when they agree to host polluting businesses
is not out of the question; however, formal compensated siting programs have not
proven successful. Id.; see generally Vicki Been, Compensated Siting Proposals:Is
it Time to Pay Attention, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 787 (1994).
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solidarity and significance. 144 Like other examples of environmental
solidarity, grassroots environmental justice advocates are united in
their quest for an environmental good, one that, in their case, centers
on the fair allocation of environmental harms and benefits. Their
fight for an environment as clean as that enjoyed by more privileged
communities is also evocative of the consistency and uniformity that
identifies solidarity.
IV. LEGAL IMPLICATIONS

There are numerous regional, state, and community environmental
initiatives in the United States that have been celebrated for their
success. This article challenges readers to think about some of these
efforts as environmental solidarity in action and to focus attention on
their ability to impact the legal system. The forces of solidarity
operate both within and beyond the immediate reach of these efforts
to nudge other legal entities into action and lure outside parties
toward their alliances. These initiatives embody both subsidiarity
and solidarity, which combine in the hope of attaining common
environmental goods that are greater than what could be achieved by
individual actions. 145 If achieved, the environmental benefits are not
146
only enjoyed by the participants, but are often scaled "up and out.",
It is this outward and upward momentum that gives these projects the
potential to affect the law in various ways. Solidarity's potential
raises practical legal considerations that deal with the status of subnational programs vis-d-vis co-existing regional and federal
programs. It also yields practical benefits that are associated with
Solidarity additionally
experimentation and political strategies.
provides substantive legal impacts that directly impact the content of
similar laws enacted by higher levels of governance. Together, these
impacts coalesce in ways that can affect the manner in which
environmental law is perceived.

144. See Popescu & Gandy, supra note 137, at 182-83 (noting that, in litigation,
environmental justice communities must deal with assumptions based on "science,

reason, and rationality").
145. Colbum, supra note 47, at 261 (stating, "[tjhese are the epistemic
opportunities of subsidiarity and solidarity: one leverages the other into a whole

greater than their sum as parts").
146. Id.
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A. PracticalConsiderationsandAdvantages

One
recurring practical
consideration
associated
with
environmental solidarity has to do with linkage. An alliance may
wish to take into account the probability that one sub-national
environmental effort may encourage the formation of similar efforts
elsewhere. Understanding the value of coordination with similar
climate change programs, California designed a statewide carbon
policy to facilitate linkage with regional and international cap and
trade programs. 147 This type of provision, aimed at achieving
integration with other initiatives, can lay important groundwork for
efficient planning and coordination in the future. 148 The goal of
future integration is tempered, however, by policies that value the
diversity of distinctive, experimental solidarity initiatives, and by the
reality that differences in approaches between similar programs may
be difficult to reconcile. 1
Nevertheless, there are advantages to
designing collaborative efforts in ways that ease mergers with other
initiatives, especially in cases where the common objective is widely
shared.
A related consideration deals with the legal status of sub-national
efforts in the event of a response by higher levels of governance. If
the success and energy of a regional solidarity program leads national
lawmakers to consider legislating in the same area, practical
questions about the legal status of the original program will need to
be addressed. Regional solidarity efforts that are designed to
integrate with a future federal program may ease a transition to a
national regime, but there is no guarantee that regional efforts will
survive should a federal law be enacted. Unlike the issue of linkage,
which is in the control of each environmental solidarity initiative, the
survival or demise of sub-national programs under principles of
concurrency or preemption is for Congress to decide. 150 The

147. Kysar & Meyler, supra note 108, at 1630-31 (explaining that an executive
order issued by Governor Schwarzenegger mandated linkages with other

programs).
148. Id. at 1637 (citing RGGI as an example).
149. Id. at 1635-36 (noting that smooth integration can be hindered by uneven
enforcement and administration by participating jurisdictions).
150. See generally Jonas Monast, Integrating State, Regional, and Federal
Greenhouse Gas Markets: Options and Tradeoffs, 18 DuKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F.

329 (2008).
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Lieberman-Wamer Bill, an early attempt to regulate GHG emissions
nationally, allowed regional cap and trade programs to survive as
long as state regulations were at least as stringent as the Act's
provisions.151 Other proposed federal legislation has been silent on
the status of regional initiatives. 152 One way or another, any federal
GHG program eventually will have to address whether sub-national
be integrated into the federal framework or
initiatives will
53
preempted. 1
The weeding-out function of solidarity programs is one of their
practical advantages. In addition to addressing the common good
through environmental improvement, environmental solidarity yields
better informed participants, efficiencies of scale,' 54 and as noted
above, experimentation.' 55 As one author explains, solidarity offers
"the experimentalist recourse to more modest options first, the use of
persuasive over coercive means that treat others as potential partners
not competitors, and the collection of data from whole experiences
revealing optimal solutions or, barring that, suboptimal solutions
acceptable to all."' 156 But there are potential drawbacks. Solidarity
efforts that form at an ill-advised level of governance may
inadequately serve the common good if they fail to consider the
interests of other jurisdictions or create inefficiencies and
inconsistencies that encourage a race to the bottom. 57 This has been
a particular concern in the area of GHG regulation, where it is feared
that stringent reduction targets in certain regions will result in
leakage. 158 The possibility also exists that program choices made by
an alliance will not perform as expected. Despite these drawbacks,
the ability of sub-national solidarity to form, flourish, and potentially
fail helps separate the good from the bad more efficiently than could
be accomplished by larger programs.

151. Id. at331 (citing S. 2191, 110th Cong. § 9004 (2007)).
152. Id. at 332. This is true of the recently passed Waxman-Markey legislation.
See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2998, 11 1th Cong.
(2009).
153. Monast, supra note 150, at 346. See also McGuinness & Ellerman, supra
note 121.
154. See Olin, supra note 104, at 1859.
155. Colbum, supra note 47, at 258-59.
156. Id.
157. Organ, supra note 66, at 271, 273.
158. Monast, supra note 150, at 335.
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There are political expediencies associated with solidarity as well.
Sub-national collaborations diffuse political risk by spreading it
among numerous parties,' 59 an advantage that may attract parties to
an alliance who might otherwise be hesitant to join. At the same
time, solidarity enhances the "representational power" of individual
participants, allowing them to enjoy the considerable political clout
that such efforts generate.' 60
The leveraging of individual
commitment to achieve a common environmental goal, accomplished
with diminished political exposure and the prospect of political gain,
not only creates an appealing prospect for many states, but generates
a vibrant political energy.
A final consideration straddles the line between the practical and
substantive. The intertwined workings of solidarity and subsidiarity
can furnish an analytical matrix for regulators to use in choosing the
optimal level of governance for environmental responses in
general. 61 By first focusing on an environmental problem, decision
makers can determine the nature of the common good to be
achieved. 162 The scope of the environmental good may then indicate
the need for action at a purely local level or may suggest an
opportunity for statewide or regional response. In short, a decision to
work in solidarity with others leads to further questions about the
levels of governance best suited for the various tasks associated with
63
the effort. These questions put principles of subsidiarity into play,'
requiring decision makers to respect the abilities and needs of lower
levels of governance. 164 Thus, solidarity and subsidarity can serve as
practical guides to aid decision makers confronting a variety of
environmental problems.
B. Substantive Impacts
The substantive legal impacts associated with environmental
solidarity are distinct from its practical considerations.
The
substantive consequences can be informative, formative, reformative,

159. See Note, supra note 104, at 1859.
160. See Maxwell, supra note 8, at 358.
161. See generally Organ, supra note 66.

162. See id. at 270.
163. Id.
164. Id. at 265.
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or normative, depending on political, regulatory, and environmental
conditions as well as the scope of the solidarity initiative itself.
The situations that trigger a community or a coalition of
communities to unite to address a common environmental problem
vary, but at least four pre-conditions have already been suggested.
First, environmental solidarity may respond to a federal regulatory
vacuum, where actors are convinced that immediate action is needed
and political backlash is either unlikely or will be too weak to derail
the effort. This type of situation is best exemplified by RGGI and the
WCI. 165 At other times, collective commitment arises when actors
believe it is necessary to supplement what they perceive to be limited,
or incomplete federal regulatory programs, a situation that spurred
the solidarity found in the Chesapeake Bay and Great Lakes
initiatives. 166 Solidarity that serves a gap-filling function is often less
of a political target than solidarity that propels efforts to create
something totally new, as the former works within67 a pre-existing
regulatory program, often with federal acquiescence. 1
Third, solidarity may be triggered to counteract federal law that is
perceived to be wrong altogether. Had the New England states
mounted a cohesive effort to combat the EPA's mercury rule, their
initiative would have served as an example of this type of
solidarity. 168 Compared to the regulatory vacuum and regulatory
supplement scenarios, this type of initiative may create the greatest
political risk because it is likely to frustrate federal law makers as
69
well as lobbyists whose efforts were successful at the federal level. 1
Finally, environmental solidarity may arise from a sense of "linked
fate" shared by otherwise disempowered community members who
face an immediate environmental threat. This is the situation of
environmental justice communities. 170
Regardless of their impetus, environmental solidarity programs
provide a means of informing existing or future laws. This impact
unfolds in two steps. Solidarity programs initially announce to the
rest of the nation and the global community that diverse and
165. See Colbum, supra note 47, at 233.
166. See Karkkainen, supra note 125, at 121-22.
167. See id. at 132.
168. See Ruhl, supra note 103, at 543-44.
169. See Colburn, supra note 47, at 259 (stating that solidarity and subsidiarity
may lessen the influcence of lobbyists).
170. See Popescu & Gandy, supra note 137, at 190.
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otherwise independent actors from regions within the United States
are willing to work together to confront serious environmental
challenges. 171 This simple communicative function is significant
because it forces others to take notice of the serious, unified efforts of
others. Once underway, the wide sharing of solidarity experiences
additionally disseminates information that can provoke, and then
guide similar sub-national initiatives or future legal response, an
effect which, in and of itself, can be transformative. 71 2 In the United
States, solidarity experiences in one area of the country have
prompted similar efforts elsewhere and have furnished valuable data
for lawmakers. One need only consider the Great Lakes initiative
and the WCI, which followed on the heels of the Chesapeake Bay
program and RGGI, respectively,
to witness the informative potential
73
work.
at
of solidarity
Flowing naturally from the information-generating function of
environmental solidarity is its potential to aid in the formation of
supplemental legal regimes. When the common good to which
solidarity aspires involves filling a gap in a functioning but
incomplete or inadequate federal program, successful stand-alone
collaborative efforts may eventually be subsumed into the federal
framework, forming a supplemental legal program. 174 An analogous
phenomenon occurs at the international level when multi-lateral
treaties prove inadequate to deal with smaller, ecosystem-wide

171. See Kysar & Meyler, supra note 108, at 1628 (noting that U.S regional
climate change initiatives informed the world that, despite the Bush
administration's failure to act, unified state initiatives were addressing the
problem).
172. See Colburn, supra note 47, at 261. One example of the type of useful
information generated by environmental solidarity is the information that will be
amassed in the GHG registry of the WCI. See Western Climate Initiative, supra
note 116. This second type of informative potential is recognized internationally as
well. Judge Macdonald notes that solidarity has the potential to "inform the major
choices states make about their right to achieve their fullest potential while not
gravely interfering with first-order principles of the community of nations."
Macdonald, supra note 3, at 301.
173. See Karkkainen, supra note 125, at 133 (noting that the Great Lakes
initiative emulates the Chesapeake Bay program). RGGI likely spurred the
development of the WCI, the latter of which will develop a regional GHG market
similar to RGGI's carbon market. See Monast, supra note 150, at 330-31.
174. See generally Karkkainen, supra note 125, at 126-32.
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degradation.' 75 Although these smaller problems affect numerous
countries, global efforts are not always the optimal response.
Similarly, certain multi-state, ecosystem-wide challenges in the
United States may be unsatisfactorily addressed by the relevant
federal regulatory program, in part because those challenges demand
something less than a national response.1 76 At the same time,
something more may be required than individual state response. 177 in
these scenarios, environmental solidarity among the jurisdictions that
share a threatened natural resource may be a wise alternative. These
coalitions, which respond to ecosystems in a "regionally tailored,
broadly interactive, collaborative, experimental, and adaptive"
manner, are on the rise. 78 It is a trend that demonstrates the linkage
between solidarity and subsidiarity while at the same time expanding
the categories of participants to include non-governmental actors.'7 9
The gap-filling success of these initiatives, in turn, can help
supplement overarching regulatory programs.
The formative potential of environmental solidarity is also evident
in the regulatory vacuum scenario. In these cases, regional efforts
can provide a political spark that ignites federal action. 180 Likewise,
regional efforts can generate regulatory tools that can be used as
models for national programs. It is likely that the provisions of both
RGGI and WCI will exert some influence on federal GHG
regulation; 8 1 indeed, the RGGI members themselves have hoped to

175. Id. at 114-15.
176. See id. at 117.
177. Id. at 120 ("[A] strategy that relies exclusively or excessively on states to
address transboundary environmental problems is likely to find a tough going.

Strategies that involve other actors whose interests are better matched to the scale
and nature of the resource and with greater incentives to initiate and sustain action
have a better chance of success.").
178. Id.
179. Id. at 123-24.
180. See Kysar & Meyler, supra note 108, at 1628.
181. See, e.g., Tessa Schwartz, William Sloan & Adam Young, Legal Issues for
Carbon-Related Transactions. Regulations, Markets, Technology & Enhancing
Value 73, 82 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 18722,
2009) (stating, "the system that emerges in the United Sates will likely be
influenced by existing international protocols - namely the Kyoto Protocol and the

EU Emissions Trading Scheme - and the existing structure created by regional
players in the United States").
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impact the substance of federal law. 182 It is also possible that generic
approaches taken in one solidarity program may help shape responses
to totally different environmental challenges, including those
touching on 83 biodiversity loss, air quality, and watershed
management. 1
Just as it may help inform and form new law, solidarity has
reformative potential that can trigger revisions to flawed federal
policies. For example, the environmental justice movement, strongly
driven by solidarity, led directly to changes in the EPA's policy for
investigating civil rights complaints. 184 A sharp increase in the
number of these complaints in the 1990s, filed by communities
claiming that state and federal environmental management activities
resulted in disparate impacts, led the EPA to issue draft guidance
documents in 2000 that institutionalized an environmental justice
complaint process. 185 Although the administrative complaint process
is not without its critics, it continues to serve as an important
mechanism by which environmental justice
groups can seek relief
86
decisions.'
permitting
from inequitable
182. Maxwell, supra note 8, at 364.
183. See Kysar & Meyler, supra note 108, at 1626.
184. See
generally CLIFFORD
RECHTSCHAFFEN
&
EILEEN
GAUNA,
ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE LAW, POLICY & REGULATION 351-52 (2003). These

complaints are brought under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and must
allege discrimination by a state permitting agency that receives federal funding. Id.
at 353. For a summary of the complaint procedure, see id. at 354. Prior to the
EPA's response, the solidarity of the environmental justice movement led President
Clinton to issue an executive order requiring every federal agency to make
environmental justice a part of its mission. Federal Actions to Address
Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income Populations, Exec.
Order No. 12,898 § 1-101, 59 Fed. Reg. 7629 (Feb. 11, 1994), reprinted in 42
U.S.C. § 4321 (2006). In that sense, environmental justice solidarity was formative
of national policy.
185. RECHTSCHAFFEN & GAUNA, supra note 184, at 351-52.
186. Id. at 354 (noting the "legal uncertainty over private remedies and the costs
of prosecuting court cases"); see also THE LAW OF ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE 23-25
(Michael B. Gerrard and Sheila R. Foster eds., 2d ed. 2008). The recent
announcement by EPA Administrator Lisa Jackson that she is making
environmental justice one of her top priorities is a hopeful sign that some of the
concerns about the vitality of the agency's environmental justice efforts will be
addressed. See Memorandum From Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator to All EPA
Employees
(Jan.
12,
2010)
available
at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/2010%20Press%20Releases!OpenView
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Environmental solidarity's informative, formative, and reformative
powers are readily identifiable. However, its normative force is more
elusive, particularly in the United States. It is the widely-held
acceptance by a community of actors that certain behavior is
appropriate that establishes a norm.1 87 Norms, rules, and regimes
188
tend to blend into one another, but they are nevertheless distinct.
As one author explains:
Norms contain somewhat clearer injunctions to members
about legitimate and illegitimate behavior, still defining
responsibilities and obligations in relatively general
terms .... The rules of a regime are difficult to distinguish
from its norms; at the margin they merge into one another.
Rules are, however, more specific: they indicate in 89more
detail the specific rights and obligations of members.'
In searching for solidarity as a norm, then, one can look to a variety
of sources, including agreements, compacts, programs, and positive
law. Regardless of the legal source, a norm of environmental
solidarity requires that solidarity itself - the unity of multiple actors
to achieve an environmental common good - becomes the standard of
practice.
As mentioned previously, international law has adopted a norm of
solidarity between developed and developing countries to address
environmental harms. 19 Even though there is no environmental
norm that unites rich and poor states in the United States, examples

&Start=100 (follow "Memorandum From Lisa P. Jackson, Administrator to All
EPA Employees" hyperlink).
187. Gerry J. Nagtzaam, The InternationalWhaling Commission and the Elusive
Great White Whale of Preservationism,33 Wm. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV.
375, 377 (2009) (quoting Jeffrey T. Checkel, Norms, Institutions and National
Identity in Contemporary Europe, 43 INT'L STUD. Q. 83, 83 (1999)).

188. International law scholars define regimes as "sets of implicit or explicit
principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors'
expectations converge in a given area of intemational relations." Id. at 377 (quoting
Stephen D. Krasner, Structural Causes and Regime Consequences, in
INTERNATIONAL REGIMES 1, 2 (Stephen D. Krasner ed., 1983)).

189. Id.
190. See Drumbl, supra note 12, at 951, 958 (explaining that the shared compact
has achieved "normative status").
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of solidarity norms still exist. 191 Within the regulatory regime of the
Clean Water Act, the Chesapeake Bay program and the Great Lakes
initiative have instituted a norm of solidarity among diverse
groupings of actors to address watershed well-being. 192 The early
success of the Chesapeake Bay effort gave that effort a legitimacy
which led directly to a similar effort for the Great Lakes. The norm
is one of solidarity among those who share an interest in an
ecosystem to unite to preserve and improve a precious natural
resource. The normative status of ecosystem-based collaboration is
reflected by its long-standing practice and duplication with the
approval of the EPA.
Intergenerational equity has also achieved normative status in
federal environmental policy. The National Environmental Policy
Act, for example, specifically lists concern for future generations in
its enumeration of the nation's environmental policies,1 93 and the
myriad of sustainability programs across the nation have adopted
intergenerational equity as a norm as well. 194 Additionally, state
constitutions that recognize a right to the environment often reference
concern for future generations.195 Whether one accepts a procedural
or substantive understanding of intergenerational equity, 196 solidarity
with or for future generations can rightly be characterized as a norm
of environmental solidarity. 197
191. Mclnerney, supra note 98, at 832, 848, 861(suggesting a communitarian
theory of property built on Unger's solidarity rights, noting the normative
implications of how rights are defined).
192. See supra text accompanying notes 126-33.

193. 42 U.S.C. § 433 1(b)(1) (2006).
194. See Dernbach, supra note 42, at 4-5.
195. See, e.g., PA. CONST. art. I, § 27 ("The people have a right to clean air, pure

water, and to the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values of
the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural resources are the common property
of all the people, including generations yet to come. As trustee of these resources,
the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for the benefit of all the
people.").
196. See

supra text accompanying

notes 42-43.

Notably, the

text of

Pennsylvania's environmental rights amendment makes clear that "people" include
both present and future generations. See PA. CONST. art. 1, § 27.
197. Solidarity, and in particular solidarity rights theory, is leaving an imprint in
other legal areas as well. As earlier noted, Thomas Mclnerney has suggested a
modification of private property theory to incorporate community-based norms
drawn from Unger's work on solidarity rights. See generally Mclnerney, supra note
98.
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This discussion is not meant to imply that the legal outcomes noted
above are solely the result of solidarity initiatives. Certainly, other
circumstances combine to influence the law. Nevertheless, the
potential for sub-national environmental solidarity to steer national
environmental policy is a force to be acknowledged, not only because
it is a legitimate contributor to the law, but also because those
contributions are helping to reshape environmental law in significant
ways.
C. An Aesthetic Shift
As the force of individual solidarity efforts continues to influence
discrete areas of environmental regulation, the totality of the pressure
exerted by these initiatives is likely to leave a broader imprint on
federal environmental law as a whole. This is perhaps the most
significant implication of sub-national environmental solidarity, as it
portends an adjustment in the aesthetics of environmental law.
In the last decade, the field of legal aesthetics has garnered a fair
amount of attention from a variety of scholars who have offered
unique theories and insights. 198 Anyone who delves into the
literature, however, will quickly conclude that the meaning of legal
aesthetics to a great extent lies in the eye of the beholder.' 99 The
understanding of legal aesthetics that drives the argument made here,
however, is captured in the thinking of two noted authors. Desmond
Manderson explains that "aesthetics is a way of knowing" that
involves engagement with something as well as its symbolic
meaning. 20 0 When it comes to matters of law, he further explains:

198. See, e.g., ADAM GEAREY, LAW AND AESTHETICS (2001); MANDERSON,
supra note 10; Heather Hughes, Aesthetics of Commercial Law - Domestic and

InternationalImplications, 67 LA. L. REv. 689 (2007); Tan Pham, Unseen Yellow, 7
How. SCROLL SOC. JUST. L. REv. 1 (2004); Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of
American Law, 115 HARV. L. REv. 1047 (2002); Jacqueline Stevens, Legal
Aesthetics of the Family and the Nation: Agoraxchange and Notes toward ReImagining the Future, 49 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 317 (2005).
199. Professor Jacqueline Stevens states, "In some approaches, legal aesthetics is
simply the use of law to regulate images. For others, legal aesthetics is akin to an
epistemology or a method implicit in judicial opinions and scholarly texts. Finally,
some scholars . . . see the law as a wide-ranging aesthetic activity in itself."
Stevens, supra note 198, at 319.
200. MANDERSON, supra note 10, at 10, 21.
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The relationship to law is twofold. First, aesthetics affect
the values of our communities, values which are in their
turn given form and symbolism within the legal system. In
the law, then, we find not only evidence of our beliefs but
traces of the aesthetic concerns that have propelled them.
But the converse also holds. The legal system is not merely
the passive mirror of a worldview. The law is a kind of
discourse whose outlook on the world takes its place as one
(frequently privileged) way of perceiving events around
us ....The gaze of the law influences all of us: it defines a
situation in a certain way and encourages us all to look at
it likewise. 201

Thus, the law not only drinks in the aesthetic-informed beliefs of
the community it governs,2 °2 it also provides an outpouring of
symbols which comprise images for public understanding.
Pierre Schlag identifies four legal aesthetics that that are at play in
the two-way process Manderson describes. 20 3 The grid aesthetic
20 4
presents the law as comprised of separate spaces and categories;
the energy aesthetic reflects law as dynamic and changing amidst the
dynamic interaction of politics, values, and policy; 20 5 the
perspectivist aesthetic creates an image of the law as mutating to take
on the social perspective of the observer; 206 and the dissociative
201. Id. at 27 (emphasis added).
202. See, e.g., Pham, supra note 198 (explaining how this phenomenon led to
laws that incorporate negative images of Asian American males); Neal Milner &
Jonathan Goldberg-Hiller, Reimagining Rights, 27 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 339, 34243 (2002) (citing the aesthetic of respectability and normalcy that dominates the
law of nationhood).
203. Schlag, supra note 198, at 1051 (noting that these aesthetics are "recurrent
forms that shape the creation, apprehension, and identity of law").
204. Id. at 1055 (explaining that the grid has places for doctrines, rules, and
elements). Some have criticized the grid aesthetic for being static and too rigid. Id.
at 1061.
205. Id. at 1070. Although there is much appeal in seeing the law as something
in motion, there is also a need for structure. Id. at 1075.
206. Id. at 1052. Schlag explains that, with the perspectivist aesthetic, "the social
or political identity of the legal actor or observer becomes the crucial situs of law
and legal inquiry." Id. The idea that law changes based on context has brought new
perspectives into the law, including those of feminists and critical race theorists. Id.
at 1085-87. Yet Schlag warns that, "[plushed to its limits, perspectivism devotes
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aesthetic portrays the law as unstable and in danger of collapse. 20 7
These aesthetics combine in countless ways, creating a diversity of
outcomes that significantly impact law's observers.
Schlag
elaborates:
In shaping our apprehension, experience, and creation of
law, the aesthetics leave their marks. In doing so, they
bring what we call law into being. Indeed, the aesthetics
have an important ontological effect: they fashion law as a
presence, an identity, something that is there, that we have,
20 8
that we can reflect upon, and over which we can argue.
The legal aesthetics associated with environmental law in the
United States can be described within the Manderson-Schlag
framework. At a bare minimum, the aesthetic impulses that feed
environmental law include the imaginings of preservationists,
conservationists,
religious
communities,
scientists,
and
2 9
economists. 0 All of these groups are guided by aesthetic concerns
that have infiltrated the halls of Congress since the inception of the
environmental movement. Each of these constituencies has a vision
of an environmentally sound nation: the preservationist's dream is
one of natural resources that are cared for and largely left intact; the
conservationist's desire is for sustainable use of natural resources;
religious imaginings range from an earth as the mother of us all to an
earth created by God and cared for by human stewards; scientists see
a nation's people and resources made healthy through the
measurement and attainment of acceptable levels of risk; and
itself to the exploration of perspective, form, and representation at the expense of
object, content, and referent." Id. at 1092.
207. Id. at 1092-94 (explaining that this aesthetic is both "a radicalization of
perspectivism" and "a movement toward the loss of form). Schlag states that the
dissociative aesthetic, which threatens all the other aesthetics, is not found in
positive law, but rather in the "brainstorming" undertaken by judges and legislators
as they engage in decision-making. See id. at 1099. For an application of Shlag's
energy and grid aesthetics to commercial law, see Hughes, supra note 198, at 70623. For a critique of Schlag's categories, see Stevens, supra note 199, at 320-21.
208. Schlag, supra note 198, at 1053.
209. Numerous law school texts describe these foundations of federal
environmental law. See, e.g., ZYGMUNT J.B. PLATER ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
AND POLICY: NATURE, LAW, AND SOCIETY 3-35 (3d ed. 2004) (detailing the
insights of Aldo Leopold, Rachel Carson, Garrett Hardin, and Ronald Coase).
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economists envision a prosperous nation that addresses pollution with
optimal efficiency. These characterizations are admittedly broad and
are not meant to capture the aesthetic inclinations of all relevant
viewpoints. 2 1 They do, however, suffice to provide a general sense
of the variety of aesthetic images incorporated into and, to various
extents, mirrored by environmental law.
Environmental law's gaze embodies the agreed-upon norms by
which the nation addresses environmental degradation, and that gaze
is taken in and returned by all who choose to engage it. The
aesthetics of law's outlook can easily be perceived as a grid,
comprised of laws that are divided into categories that address air,
water, land, endangered species, forests, and the like. The grid is
further divided within each of those laws into separate components
that address various sub-categories. For example, the Clean Air Act
separately regulates mobile sources, stationary sources, attainment
areas, non-attainment areas, criteria pollutants, and toxics. 21 The
Endangered Species Act imposes separate prohibitions on federal
agencies and private parties, 212 and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act divides the solid waste universe into hazardous and
non-hazardous waste. 2 13 Beyond basic divisions such as these,
statutory sections are further divided into subsections that are
comprised of further elemental divisions, only to be even more
carefully delineated in regulations. 214
The grid aesthetic also establishes a hierarchy within
environmental law, which generally places federal law and EPA
regulation at the highest level of governance with state
210. Two other viewpoints worth noting are those of green economists, who seek
to assign values to the world's ecosystems and the services they provide for
humans, and ecofeminists, who see parallels between the masculine domination of
women and man's domination of nature. See generally, Robert Costanza et al., The
Value of the World's Ecosystem Services and Natural Capital, 387 NATURE 253
(1997); Alyson C. Flournoy, In Search of an Environmental Ethic, 28 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 63, 83 (2003).
211. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q (2006).
212. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536, 1538 (2006).
213. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6921, 6941 (2006).
214. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7410(a) (2006) (setting forth mandatory requirements
for a state implementation plan under the CAA); 40 C.F.R. § 52.21(b)(1)(ii) (2006
& Supp. 2009) (listing various categories of sources that must include their fugitive
emission when determining whether they are major stationary sources for the
purposes of the Clean Air Act's Prevention of Significant Deterioration Program).
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implementation of certain programs conditioned on federal
permission and oversight.215 With rare exceptions, states remain free
to enact their own environmental laws as long as they are at least as
stringent as federal laws.2 16 The grid aesthetic thus presents a highly
compartmentalized image of media-specific, top-down regulation
with close control of state environmental initiatives.
The energy aesthetic of environmental law is evident in the
relatively short, but rich history of Congressional response to a host
of environmental threats.217 Congressional action has at times been
swift - typically in response to well-publicized environmental crises 218 and at other times has been painstakingly slow. 219
Nevertheless,
Congressional action by way of legislation and oversight has been the
norm since 1970. The energy aesthetic is more specifically reflected
in numerous provisions that allow or require regulatory revisions to a
host of environmental standards and lists in response to scientific
advances or other developments. Animals and plants can be added to
and removed from the endangered species list based on scientific and
commercial data. 22 Criteria pollutants and toxic pollutants can be
added to the lists of those already regulated under the Clean Air Act,
and allowable concentrations of those pollutants may be adjusted as
science improves. 22 1 Effluent limitations and water quality standards
are routinely modified under the Clean Water Act. 222 New sites can

215. Two prominent examples are state implementation of national ambient air
quality standards under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006), and NPDES
permitting under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2006).
216. See PLATER, supra note 209, at 328 (noting that federal environmental laws
"leave room" for more stringent state laws); TOD I. ZUCKERMAN ET AL.,

9.11 (2009)
(stating that "federal environmental statues do not preempt state statutes if the state
statutes are, at a minimum, as tough as their federal counterparts").
ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITY ALLOCATION: LAW AND PRACTICE §

217. See generally ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION:
LAW, SCIENCE, AND POLICY 88-94 (5th ed. 2006) (providing a succinct history of

environmental law).
218. See PLATER, supra note 209, at 886 (noting that the toxic contamination at

Love Canal and Times Beach ignited public furor that led to the enactment of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act).
219. The failure of the federal government to meaningfully address climate
change led directly to the formation of RGGI. See text accompanying note 165.
220. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(b) (2006).
221. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7408(a), 7409(d), 7412(b)(2) (2006).
222. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1312(b), 1313(c) (2006).
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be added to the National Priorities List under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act. 223 A
complete list is hardly needed to make the point that environmental
laws are designed to adapt to scientific advances and changed
conditions.
Energy of a different sort is emitted by the vertical hierarchy of the
grid. This image is one of strong action by the federal government
directed at states and regulated entities. The flow and force of this
energy has earned environmental law its "command and control"
moniker. 224 A similar sort of power is reflected in statutory sections
that force disclosure by regulated entities, 225 prohibit certain
activities outright, 226 and threaten to end the EPA's foot-dragging by
Congressionally-imposed draconian provisions if statutory deadlines
are not met. 2 27 The energy aesthetic, then, is one that presents
environmental law as responsive to present developments and
moving forward to address new challenges and scientific findings,
while exerting firm federal control from a position of superiority.
A perspectivist aesthetic pictures environmental law as a regime
that mutates to address the perspectives of its observers. The mere
welcoming of diverse views does not create such an aesthetic in the
law. What is additionally necessary is a change in the law to reflect
new perspectives. The law has, from time to time, departed from its
command and control tradition to respond to market-based
perspectives. Congress did so when it created the Clean Air Act's

223. 42 U.S.C § 9605(g) (2006).
224. The use of that three-word phrase to refer to the traditional approach to
environmental regulation is ubiquitous in environmental law commentary. See, e.g.,
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., RODGER'S ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 1:3 (2009)
(referring to environmental law's "conventional command-and-control"
regulation).
225. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006) (requiring disclosure, by way of an
environmental impact statement, of the environmental impacts caused by federal
agency action); 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a) (2006) (requiring notification to the National
Response Center when reportable quantities of hazardous substances are released).
226. See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1)(B) (2006) (prohibiting the taking of
endangered species).
227. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 6924(d) (2006) (banning the land disposal of certain
hazardous wastes altogether unless the EPA promulgated risk-based disposal
standards by a firm deadline).
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acid rain program and similar programs in its wake. 228 And as noted
earlier, the perspectives of struggling, underserved communities have
been accommodated by the EPA's environmental justice initiatives.
In these examples, environmental law has shown a propensity to
transform entrenched provisions and practices to respond to
previously ignored or under-valued perspectives. 229
As Schlag explains, the dissociative aesthetic emerges when there
is an overabundance of perspectivism. 230 This aesthetic presents
itself as the law sifts through and seeks to respond to an array of
viewpoints. Environmental law's much-celebrated pluralism 23 1 has
created an aesthetic of inclusion, diversity, and the give and take of
political bargaining, but those components alone are insufficient to
cast an image of instability and disintegration. That level of
disruption emerges most often during the course of legal decisionmaking and is not normally found in positive law.232 Nevertheless,
arguments exist that certain environmental statutes or portions of
statutes project so many perspectives that they in fact present an
aesthetic of insecurity. 233 The competing perspectives of federal
agencies, interested parties, and the courts, in combination with
procedural practices that arguably short-change statutory objectives,
have led some to question whether NEPA is anything more than a
"paper tiger" or "a symbolic assurance sham.'234 Some have
228. Congress responded to increased calls for the use of market instruments to
deal with environmental problems in 1990, when it codified a cap-and-trade
program to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions from coal-fired power plants. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 7651-7661f (2006); PLATER, supra note 209, at 713. The WaxmanMarkey Bill, the first piece of GHG legislation to pass either house in Congress,
also included a cap-and-trade program. See John M. Broder, Adding" Something
for Everyone, House Leaders Gained a Climate Bill", N.Y. TIMES, July 1, 2009, at
A20.
229. To a certain extent, environmental law's mutation in these examples is also
reflective of the energy aesthetic.
230. Schlag, supra note 198, at 1092 ("Paradoxically, even as it drives itself into
the ground, the ever-increasing, ever more radical reflexivity of perspectivism leads
to disintegration. Indeed, it leads to the dissociative aesthetic.").
231. See Eileen Gauna, The Environmental Justice Misfit: Public Participation
and the Paradigm Paradox, 17 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3, 24 (1998) (remarking that
environmental law is "pluralist-created and pluralist-driven").
232. Schlag, supra note 198, at 1099.
233. See id. at 1092.
234. See PLATER, supra note 209, at 475. NEPA pronounces a strong national
environmental policy comprised of numerous objectives, and requires federal
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similarly argued that endangered species listing decisions and critical
habitat designations have become so riddled with delays and
impasses due to the intransigence of competing interests that the
Endangered Species Act's provisions have become unworkable.235
NEPA and the ESA are routinely identified as laws that announce
and further expressly enumerated environmental policies and that
protect endangered and threatened species and their habitats,
respectively. To the extent perspective-induced impasses, tensions,
and retreats have begun to dissolve the identities of these statutes, the
dissociative aesthetic has presented itself.236

These observations are derived from the inclinations of the author's
own aesthetic sensibilities, and a variety of other formulations of the
aesthetics of environmental law are undoubtedly plausible. Still, the
core image of environmental law as an intricately divided patchwork,
capable of change under the firm hand of the federal government,
responsive to the perspectives of others, with some components in
danger of failing to live up to their promise, seems a fair one. It is
offered here as a conglomerate aesthetic against which sub-national
agencies to further those goals in part by issuing Environmental Impact Statements
(EISs) when they propose major actions with significant environmental impacts.
42 U.S.C. §§ 4331-4332 (2006). In recent years, agencies have avoided the
burdensome preparation of EISs by issuing shorter environmental assessments that
include mitigation provisions, a process that allows agencies to issue Findings of
No Significant Impact (FONSIs), thus avoiding the preparation of full-blown EISs.
See Matthew J. Lindstrom, Procedures without Purpose: The Withering Away of
the National EnvironmentalPolicy Act's Substantive Law, 20 J. LAND RESOURCES
& ENVTL. L. 245, 263 (2000). Further, the originally permissive judicial attitude
toward NEPA's provisions has become increasingly unsympathetic. See, e.g.,
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (establishing that an EIS need not be
prepared until an agency has a formal proposal for agency action); Vermont
Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978) (noting that
NEPA is "essentially procedural").
235. See PLATER, supra note 209, at 793; PERCIVAL ET AL., supra note 217
(citing the "inadequacies of [the Endangered Species Act's] eleventh-hour, speciesby-species approach to conservation" that has spurred new approaches to species
protection).
236. In the case of NEPA, one scholar believed this threshold was reached some
time ago. Writing in 1992, Philip Ferester observed, "NEPA is far past its best
days, and hasfaded to a mere shadow of its former self " Philip Michael Ferester,
Revitalizing the National EnvironmentalPolicy Act: Substantive Law Adaptations
from NEPA's Progeny, 16 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 207, 224 (1992) (emphasis
added).
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solidarity's legal force can be considered. The inquiry as to the
impact solidarity is or is not making on environmental law's
aesthetics builds on the thesis that solidarity is working in various
The
ways that are already impacting environmental law.
acknowledgement of the outward and upward impulses of subnational solidarity lends a significant layer to the analysis and leads
to the conclusion that an aesthetic shift is underway.
Environmental law's outward gaze, as perceived by its observers in
Schlag's categories, has become more complex, swirling, welcoming,
and perhaps precarious at the hands of sub-national solidarity. As
solidarity initiatives reach a formative, reformative, and normative
pitch, the complexity of environmental law's grid aesthetic
intensifies. The watershed-driven programs for the Chesapeake Bay
and Great Lakes are now embedded in the Clean Water Act as
distinctly unique entities. Title VI environmental justice complaint
procedures supplement the EPA's permit review. Additionally, the
House of Representative's passage of cap-and-trade regulation for
greenhouse gasses, spurred to some extent by RGGI and the WCI,
would add an entire regulatory program to environmental law's
matrix. 237 The impact of each solidarity initiative discussed in this
article has, in its own way, contributed to a more intricate and
complicated grid. Further, the increased numbers and successes of
the state solidarity programs have expanded the size of the grid space
occupied by the states, local governments, and non-governmental
organizations, all of which are squeezing more room out of a more
finely delineated grid.
The legal forces associated with environmental solidarity are also
modifying the largely top-down energy aesthetic of environmental
law. The informative capacity of solidarity clearly fuels the legal
energy that is emited by environmental law's response to new
developments, but it does more. When state and other sub-national
efforts strengthen to the point of becoming formative of federal law, a
more intense legal energy flows from the bottom up and between
regional actors, creating a swirling, multi-directional energy that was
less apparent before. The give and take between regional actors and
the upward impetus of RGGI and the WCI demonstrate this new
dynamic.
237. See American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009, H.R. 2998, 11 1th
Cong. (2009).
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Environmental law has also made adjustments to account for the
different perspectives of parties who act in solidarity. The EPA's
development of administrative procedures in response to
environmental justice solidarity is one example; another is the Clean
Water Act's acquiescence and ultimate acceptance of regional
watershed programs that include the perspectives of non-state actors
including NGOs. In both of these examples, the strength of solidarity
provided groups and regions with the clout they needed to motivate
lawmakers to change the law to reflect the perspectives of the groups
or regions, thereby enriching the perspectivist aesthetic of
environmental law.
A broader perspectivism in environmental law's aesthetics seems
laudable, but it leads one to question whether it risks blurring or
destabilizing the image of environmental law. The perspectivist
aesthetic casts an image of law that not only welcomes diverse
insights, but that mutates in response to new viewpoints. Subnational solidarity's growth, persistence, and influence may motivate
Congress or the EPA to adjust various programs, but federal
acceptance of localized collective action can result in negative spillover effects. 238 To the extent federal environmental law is willing to
adjust in response to efforts that privilege the perspectives of some
sub-national groups to the detriment of others, its image as a firm and
fair controller of national environmental policy begins to dissipate.
The perception of Congress and the EPA as the dominant, evenhanded drivers of environmental law in the United States is
weakened. The risk of this type of dissociative outcome is mitigated
by political, market-based, and judicial constraints, 239 making it
unlikely that a multitude of solidarity-driven changes in
environmental law will create an aesthetic of uncomfortable
instability. Nevertheless, the workings of sub-national environmental
solidarity often mean eventual change in federal law, and to the
extent that change is disruptive in any way, there will be dissociative
shadings in the legal aesthetics that emanate from environmental law.

238. See Olin, supra note 104, at 1856.
239. Id. at 1865-72 (pointing to the requirement of Congressional approval for
some interstate agreements, business flight from regions adopting stringent
environmental measures, and resort to the courts to curtail sub-national efforts
under the Commerce Clause and antitrust law); see also Maxwell, supra note 8, at
355-60 (generally discussing legal constraints on interstate compacts).
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V. CONCLUSION

Characterizing sub-national environmental efforts as solidarity in
action does more than provide a refreshing nuance to environmental
discourse; it provides an opportunity to consider the power of these
initiatives and the impact that power may have on the formation and
structure of federal environmental law.
As these initiatives
proliferate, their legal impact will be felt in various ways. The
collective force of these efforts has the potential to significantly
transform portions of environmental law, and as it does, it also may
transform the way environmental law defines itself and how it is
perceived.

